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ARTICLE
CARROTS AND STICKS IN PRIVATE
CLIMATE GOVERNANCE
by: Jonathan M. Gilligan*
ABSTRACT
When public governance fails to address important environmental threats—
such as climate change—private governance by firms, not-for-profits, individ-
uals, and households can produce significant reductions in greenhouse gas
emissions. Private governance can take the form of either a carrot or a stick,
using incentives or punishments. Shareholder activism as a form of private
governance of corporations has largely been confrontational, leading most cli-
mate-related actions to fail. This Article examines the potential for private
governance to take a more collaborative approach and to frame shareholder
engagement with management in terms of opportunity. It also examines pri-
vate governance successes at reducing household emissions and finds that
these too emphasize making it attractive and convenient for households to act.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2017, as the United States repudiated its previous commitments
to fighting climate change, both internationally and domestically,
more than 1,700 businesses and investors stepped forward to declare
that they remained committed to cutting greenhouse gas emissions.1
They joined hundreds of not-for-profit organizations, such as colleges,
universities, and faith-based organizations, as well as city, county, and
* Associate Professor, Department of Earth and Environmental Sciences and
Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, Vanderbilt University.
1. Jennifer A. Dlouhy, As Trump Steps Back from Climate Talks, Coke and HP
Move In, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 7, 2017, 11:00 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2017-11-08/as-trump-steps-back-from-un-climate-talks-coke-and-hp-move-in
[https://perma.cc/65FJ-N3DP].
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state governments, to form the “We Are Still In” coalition.2 This an-
nouncement focused attention on the growing power of private orga-
nizations, both for-profit and not-for-profit, to use their market power
to perform activities traditionally associated with public governance
and regulation. The not-for-profit organization CDP (formerly the
Carbon Disclosure Project) reports that pressure from large purchas-
ing firms led their suppliers to reduce annual carbon dioxide emissions
by more than 550 million metric tons.3
Attention to environmental, social, and governance (“ESG”) issues
by institutional investors has expanded from a niche of socially re-
sponsible investment funds and now encompasses a broad variety of
funds, including public and private pension funds, insurance compa-
nies, and large investment funds.4 These funds are primarily con-
cerned about the impact of ESG issues—such as climate change—on
financial performance, whereas earlier socially responsible investors
were mostly concerned about ethical issues.5 A growing number of
pension-fund managers and trustees in the United States and abroad
conclude that their fiduciary responsibilities include acting to offset
threats to the long-term performance of their funds due to climate
change.6 Insurers and bond-rating firms are applying pressure on pri-
vate firms and governments alike to address their exposure to climate-
related risks.7 Moody’s Investor Service recently announced that it
2. Id.; see also America is Still In. Are You?, WE ARE STILL IN, https://www.we
arestillin.com/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2018) [https://perma.cc/PKP8-ULFB].
3. CDP, CLOSING THE GAP: SCALING UP SUSTAINABLE SUPPLY CHAINS 4, 6
(2018), available at https://6fefcbb86e61af1b2fc4-c70d8ead6ced550b4d987d7c03fcdd1
d.ssl.cf3.rackcdn.com/cms/reports/documents/000/003/014/original/CDP_Supply_Cha
in_Report_2018.pdf?1518084325 [https://perma.cc/Q35D-XWSM].
4. Stuart L. Gillan & Laura T. Starks, The Evolution of Shareholder Activism in
the United States, 19 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 55, 63–64 (2007); W. Trexler Proffitt, Jr. &
Andrew Spicer, Shaping the Shareholder Activism Agenda: Institutional Investors and
Global Social Issues, 4 STRATEGIC ORG. 165 (2016); Emma Sjo¨stro¨m, Shareholder
Activism for Corporate Social Responsibility: What Do We Know?, 16 SUSTAINABLE
DEV. 141 (2008).
5. Gary J. Cundill et al., Non-financial Shareholder Activism: A Process Model
for Influencing Corporate Environmental and Social Performance, 20 INT’L J. MGMT.
REVS. 606 (2018); Jody Grewal et al., Shareholder Activism on Sustainability Issues
(Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper 17-003, 2016).
6. David Hess, Public Pensions and the Promise of Shareholder Activism for the
Next Frontier of Corporate Governance: Sustainable Economic Development, 2 VA. L.
& BUS. REV. 221, 223–25 (2007); MATTHEW BINSTED ET AL., CLIMATE CHANGE RISK
AND THE MARYLAND STATE RETIREMENT AND PENSION SYSTEM, CTR. FOR GLOB.
SUSTAINABILITY 10–11 (2017), available at https://static1.squarespace.com/static/57f
412f329687f78aa26ded4/t/59d66bd3be42d6d41ba6865d/1507224543565/Climate+Chan
ge+Risk+and™he+MD+SRPS.pdf [https://perma.cc/NG5Q-EUML]; see RHODE IS-
LAND TREASURY ENGAGEMENT OVERVIEW 2017 SHAREHOLDER SEASON, OFFICE OF
THE GEN. TREASURER (2017), available at http://d10k7k7mywg42z.cloudfront.net/as
sets/59959275407808649f02494a/Shareholder_Engagement_Overview_RI_Treasury_
2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/95G4-SFGB].
7. Karl Mathiesen, Rating Climate Risks to Credit Worthiness, 8 NATURE CLI-
MATE CHANGE 454–56 (2018).
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would downgrade its ratings of cities and states that it judged under-
prepared for climate risks.8 Lloyd’s of London recently joined fifteen
other large insurance companies in divesting from coal companies,9
and several other insurance companies have announced that they will
deny coverage to coal mines and coal-burning power plants.10 Just
before the June 2018 meeting of the G7, a consortium of 288 institu-
tional investors with $26 trillion in assets called on the G7 govern-
ments to rapidly phase out the use of coal, eliminate fossil fuel
subsidies, and impose a significant price on greenhouse gas
emissions.11
Political activists have received considerable attention for their ac-
tions to pressure institutional investors, such as college and university
endowments, to divest from fossil-fuel companies.12 Activist investors
have also received attention for pressuring companies to disclose the
risks they face related to climate change.13
These kinds of actions are confrontational and punitive. Their prin-
cipal effect, if successful, would be to hurt the target company’s share
price and to publicly shame the company for its contributions to
global climate change. Punishment and shaming can be useful tools
for effecting change, but they do not always work. Even when they do
work, they may not be the most effective measures. Positive and con-
structive engagements—carrots, rather than sticks—have not received
as much attention as negative ones, but I argue in this Article that
they have considerable potential, especially in a society as politically
8. Jeff Nesbit, When Climate Change Becomes a Credit Problem, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/13/opinion/climate-change-
credit.html [https://perma.cc/N498-75PH]; Press Release, Moody’s Investor Service,
Climate Change is Forecast to Heighten US Exposure to Economic Loss Placing
Short- and Long-Term Credit Pressure on US States and Local Governments (Nov.
28, 2017), https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-Climate-change-is-forecast-to-
heighten-US-exposure-to—PR_376056 [https://perma.cc/84UC-WL2K].
9. Julia Kollewe, Lloyd’s of London to Divest from Coal over Climate Change,
GUARDIAN (Jan. 21, 2018), http://www.theguardian.com/business/2018/jan/21/lloyds-
of-london-to-divest-from-coal-over-climate-change [https://perma.cc/9ZFC-GB6S].
10. Oliver Ralph, Insurers Go Cold on Coal Industry, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2018),
https://www.ft.com/content/7ec63f34-f20c-11e7-ac08-07c3086a2625 [https://perma.cc/
757Z-6S63].
11. Alister Doyle, Big Investors Urge G7 to Step Up Climate Action, Shift from
Coal, REUTERS (June 3, 2018, 6:21 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-climate
change-investors/big-investors-urge-g7-to-step-up-climate-action-shift-from-coal-idUS
KCN1IZ0ZP [https://perma.cc/Y2A2-BGRC].
12. Julie Ayling & Neil Gunningham, Non-State Governance and Climate Policy:
The Fossil Fuel Divestment Movement, 17 CLIMATE POL’Y 131, 135 (2015); Randall
Smith, A New Divestment Focus on Campus: Fossil Fuels, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 5, 2013,
3:53 PM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/09/05/a-new-divestment-focus-fossil-fu
els/ [https://perma.cc/AVF5-PBFG].
13. Attracta Mooney & Ed Crooks, Top Investment Groups Push for Action on
Climate Risks, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 1, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/48ad5476-a6aa-
11e7-ab55-27219df83c97 [https://perma.cc/7GQ9-QWCR]; BINSTED ET AL., supra
note 6, at 17; Grewal et al., supra note 5, at 16.
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polarized over climate change as the United States. In Exit, Voice, and
Loyalty, Albert Hirschman argued that stakeholders dissatisfied with
an organization’s performance may seek better outcomes either
through exit (e.g., customers may patronize a competitor, voters may
switch parties, and investors may divest from a poorly performing
firm) or voice (stakeholders may complain or make suggestions).14
Hirschman argued that relying only on one mode diminished the ef-
fectiveness of engagement, both for the organization and for the
stakeholders.
II. PRIVATE GOVERNANCE BY INVESTORS AND FIRMS
Private governance occurs when private entities—businesses, not-
for-profit organizations, individuals, etc.—pursue a goal traditionally
associated with public governance, such as reducing greenhouse gas
emissions, through actions that produce broad influence over others.15
This influence is what distinguishes private governance from actions
whose sole or principal effect is to reduce the actor’s own emissions
with little impact on others’ actions. Examples of businesses and other
private organizations acting as regulators include firms using supply-
chain contracting to coerce their suppliers to reduce their greenhouse
gas emissions and investors pressuring firms to disclose their carbon
emissions or adopt sustainable business practices.
Private environmental governance is unlikely to make a satisfactory
substitute for public regulations, but it has the potential to make
meaningful contributions to reducing greenhouse gas emissions.16 It is
important, even necessary, for addressing climate change because the
United States federal government has largely abdicated its commit-
ments to address the threat of climate change.17
Vandenbergh and Gilligan have proposed a framework for analyz-
ing private governance in terms of technical potential, behavioral plas-
ticity, and policy plasticity. Technical potential refers to the total
emissions reduction that a class of actions could achieve with perfect
compliance. Behavioral plasticity refers to the degree of compliance
that could be expected under a well-executed private governance pol-
icy, taking into account that private actors have far less power to com-
pel action than public governments do. Policy plasticity refers to the
14. ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DE-
CLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 3–5 (1970); see also Jennifer Good-
man et al., Social Shareholder Engagement: The Dynamics of Voice and Exit, 125 J.
BUS. ETHICS 193 (2014) (discussing the applicability and limitations of Hirschman’s
analysis to shareholder engagement with firms in disputes over social and environ-
mental issues).
15. MICHAEL P. VANDENBERGH & JONATHAN M. GILLIGAN, BEYOND POLITICS:
THE PRIVATE GOVERNANCE RESPONSE TO CLIMATE CHANGE 8–14 (2017).
16. Id. at 3.
17. Id. at 70–75.
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ability of a private entity to enact and implement private-governance
policies.
A. Technical Potential
Walmart partnered with the Environmental Defense Fund to re-
duce the greenhouse gas emissions from its supply chain by 28 million
metric tons of CO2 between 2010 and 2015 and pledged to reduce its
supply-chain emissions from 2015–2030 by a total of one billion tons.18
CDP reports on ninety-nine large purchasing firms who engaged with
their suppliers to assess and reduce greenhouse gas emissions.19 More
than 4,800 suppliers responded and reduced their annual emissions by
more than 550 million metric tons of CO2 through efficiency measures
that saved $14 billion per year.20 These results appear to be just a
fraction of what supply-chain contracting can achieve because most
sustainable supply-chain contracting only targets first-tier suppliers,
which suggests that much greater emissions reductions could be ob-
tained by extending these practices deeper into supply chains.21
Another area with large technical potential is bringing energy-effi-
cient products to market. For example, residential lighting in the
United States produces greenhouse gas emissions equivalent to
roughly 210 million metric tons of CO2 per year.22 Replacing in-
18. Press Release, Walmart, Walmart Launches Project Gigaton to Reduce Emis-
sions in Company’s Supply Chain (Apr. 19, 2017), https://news.walmart.com/2017/04/
19/walmart-launches-project-gigaton-to-reduce-emissions-in-companys-supply-chain
[https://perma.cc/9ZQ5-RBAT]; ENVTL. DEF. FUND, The Power of Partnerships 7
(Feb. 2016), http://business.edf.org/files/2016/02/EDF-Walmart-10-Year-Journey-
Case-Study.FINAL_.pdf [https://perma.cc/MUC5-YHDA] (“Walmart not only met
but surpassed the climate goal of reducing 20 [million metric tons] of [greenhouse gas
emissions] from its global supply chain. And by the end of 2015, Walmart had
achieved a 28 [million metric ton] reduction.”).
19. CDP, supra note 3, at 3.
20. Id. at 6.
21. Id.; Tannis Thorlakson et al., Companies’ Contribution to Sustainability
Through Global Supply Chains, 115 PNAS 2072, 2075 (2018), http://www.pnas.org/
content/pnas/115/9/2072.full.pdf [https://perma.cc/5FUA-TAX7 ].
22. Table 4. Residential Sector Key Indicators and Consumption, U.S. ENERGY
INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2018 WITH PROJECTIONS TO 2050 (2018),
https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/aeo/pdf/AEO2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/8JNX-KRZ9]
(reporting that U.S. households consumed 1.36 quads of electricity for lighting in
2016); EGRID SUMMARY TABLES 2016, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (Feb. 2018),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2018-02/documents/egrid2016_summaryta-
bles.pdf [https://perma.cc/F634-XYN4] (reporting that on average 1 megawatt hour of
electricity produces greenhouse gas emissions equivalent to 1004.2 pounds of carbon
dioxide); Energy Units, AM. PHYSICAL SOC’Y, https://www.aps.org/policy/reports/
popa-reports/energy/units.cfm (last visited July 8, 2018) [https://perma.cc/ASX7-
HDJH] (reporting that 1 kilowatt hour is equal to 3412 BTU, which implies that 1
quad (1015 BTU) is equal to 2.9×108 megawatt hours). Combining these figures, we
find that lighting consumes 4.0×10^8 megawatt hours per year of electricity at the
home, which corresponds to 4.2×10^8 megawatt hours of electricity at the power
plant, which is responsible for emitting greenhouse gases equivalent to roughly 210
million tons of carbon dioxide.
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candescent bulbs with compact fluorescent (“CFL”) or LED bulbs
reduces energy consumption, and thus greenhouse gas emissions, by
75–80%.23 In 2007, Walmart announced an initiative to move CFL
bulbs from a niche product into the mainstream by stocking inexpen-
sive, reliable CFL bulbs (previously, the bulbs had to be purchased in
specialty stores or through the mail) and set a goal of selling 100 mil-
lion bulbs in a single year, which it achieved almost three months
ahead of schedule.24 Several years later, Walmart began working with
its suppliers to produce an inexpensive, high-quality LED light bulb
that would be more efficient and reliable than CFL bulbs.25 A large
part of the challenge was that in 2010, LED bulbs equivalent to a 60-
Watt incandescent bulb sold for around $40, and Walmart sought to
break through the $10 price point.26 In 2013, General Electric released
the first mass-market LED bulb below $10, and Walmart followed
shortly with a house-brand bulb for under $9.27 This precipitous drop
in price coincided with a dramatic increase in sales, from around
twelve million bulbs in 2012, to seventy-eight million bulbs in 2014, to
more than 200 million bulbs in 2015. The rapid rise in LED lightbulb
sales coincided with an unprecedented drop in per-capita residential
electricity consumption in the United States, after sixty years of steady
increases at an average rate of 4% per year.28 An economic analysis of
this decline in consumption suggests that the rise in energy-efficient
lighting (both CFL and LED) is likely responsible.29 In using its
power as a major purchaser to pressure its suppliers to produce new
23. How Energy-Efficient Light Bulbs Compare with Traditional Incandescents,
U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, https://www.energy.gov/energysaver/save-electricity-and-fuel/
lighting-choices-save-you-money/how-energy-efficient-light (last visited Feb. 26, 2018)
[https://perma.cc/Q5PZ-SZDS].
24. Press Release, Walmart, Wal-Mart Surpasses Goal to Sell 100 Million Com-
pact Fluorescent Light Bulbs Three Months Early (Oct. 2, 2017), https://corporate.
walmart.com/_news_/news-archive/2007/10/02/wal-mart-surpasses-goal-to-sell-100-
million-compact-fluorescent-light-bulbs-three-months-early [https://perma.cc/BGW6-
ZXNG].
25. Peter Kelly-Detwiler, How Walmart Brought Low-Cost LEDs to the Mass
Market, FORBES (Nov. 5, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/peterdetwiler/2013/11/05/
how-walmart-brought-low-cost-leds-to-the-mass-market/ [https://perma.cc/CJ3Y-9K
KE].
26. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, REVOLUTION . . . NOW: THE FUTURE ARRIVES FOR
FIVE CLEAN ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES—2015 UPDATE 11 (2015), https://www.energy.
gov/sites/prod/files/2015/11/f27/Revolution-Now-11132015.pdf [https://perma.cc/
P7V3-L2AU].
27. Id.; Leah Rae, GE and Walmart Team Up to Make Energy Efficiency More
Accessible, LED INSIDE (Oct. 3, 2013), http://www.ledinside.com/news/2013/10/ge_
and_walmart_team_up_to_make_energy_efficiency_more_accessible [https://perma.
cc/J5RT-SRFP]; Judy Lin, Walmart Shows Aggressive Streak by Launching Under
US$ 9 LED Bulbs, LED INSIDE (Oct. 4, 2013), http://www.ledinside.com/news/2013/
10/walmart_shows_aggressive_streak_by_launching_under_us_9_led_bulbs [https://
perma.cc/R3MX-SFCL].
28. Lucas W. Davis, Evidence of Decline in Electricity Use by U.S. Households, 37
ECON. BULL. 1098, 1098 (2017).
29. Id. at 2.
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energy-efficient lighting products and using its stores and marketing to
promote those products, Walmart acted analogously to public regula-
tors who set energy-efficiency standards. However, it is noteworthy
that Walmart did not apply a stick (refusing to stock inefficient prod-
ucts) so much as a carrot (offering access to enhanced marketing and
product placement) for inexpensive, high-quality, energy-efficient
products.
B. Behavioral Plasticity
For activism by institutional investors, I assess behavioral plasticity
as the response of companies to investor-led initiatives. For energy-
efficient consumer products, I assess behavioral plasticity by sales.
Businesses, especially large ones, respond to concern over environ-
mental and sustainability issues by institutional investors. 70% of the
Standard & Poor’s 500 (“S&P 500”) disclosed their climate-related en-
vironmental data to CDP.30 Companies also respond to investor con-
cerns by making public disclosures of environmental impacts and
risks,31 and firms that make such disclosures subsequently tend to re-
duce their emissions over time.32 Irrespective of shareholder activism,
greater institutional ownership of a firm’s shares leads firms to in-
crease socially and environmentally responsible activities.33 Addition-
ally, greater institutional ownership leads firms to become more
responsive to shareholder activism on social responsibility, especially
with regard to the environment.34 However, emissions reductions are
smaller in energy-intensive firms, such as electric power generating
companies,35 which is concerning because those firms tend to have es-
pecially high emissions. In addition, there is some evidence that cor-
porate political influence over regulators can enable management to
stymie shareholder resolutions.36
Shareholder resolutions are a growing form of private-governance
engagement, and even when initiatives on sustainability issues fail to
30. CDP US Report 2017: Key Findings on Governance, ESG and the Role of the
Board of Directors, CDP 2 (Dec. 2017), https://b8f65cb373b1b7b15feb-c70d8ead6ced5
50b4d987d7c03fcdd1d.ssl.cf3.rackcdn.com/cms/reports/documents/000/002/891/origi
nal/CDP-US-Report-2017-v2.pdf?1519227634 [https://perma.cc/M7CJ-CSNS].
31. Julie Cotter & Muftah M. Najah, Institutional Investor Influence on Global
Climate Change Disclosure Practices, 37 AUSTL. J. MGMT. 169, 185 (2012).
32. Wei Qian & Stefan Schaltegger, Revisiting Carbon Disclosure and Perform-
ance: Legitimacy and Management Views, 49 BRIT. ACCT. REV. 365, 373 (2017).
33. Tao Chen et al., Institutional Shareholders and Corporate Social Responsibility:
Evidence from Two Quasi-Natural Experiments, VOLATILITY INST. 26 (2016), availa-
ble at https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2924752 [https://perma.cc/MVY4-WPX3].
34. Id. at 18.
35. Id.; Daniel C. Matisoff, Different Rays of Sunlight: Understanding Information
Disclosure and Carbon Transparency, 55 ENERGY POL’Y 579, 588 (2013).
36. Michael Hadani et al., Corporate Political Activity and Regulatory Capture:
How Some Companies Blunt the Knife of Socially Oriented Investor Activism, 44 J.
MGMT. 2064, 2086–87 (2018).
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attract majority support, they can still have a significant effect on im-
proving corporate performance on those issues.37
The examples discussed above about Walmart’s initiatives on CFL
and LED light bulbs illustrate that consumers can be influenced to
adopt energy-efficient products when high-quality products are conve-
niently available at reasonable prices. A simple set of design principles
has been identified for engaging with individual and household behav-
iors on energy efficiency, and these can be used to design private-gov-
ernance measures targeted at the residential sector.38
C. Policy Plasticity
A rapidly growing number of institutional investors are becoming
concerned about holding companies accountable for climate-related
risks. The CERES Investor Network on Climate Risk and Sus-
tainability includes more than 160 institutional investors, who manage
a total of more than $25 trillion and are working together to promote
sustainable practices on water, climate, and energy by the firms they
invest in.39 Climate Action 100+ is a coalition of more than 225 institu-
tional investors controlling more than $26 trillion in assets who have
committed to a five-year plan to press the largest corporate green-
house gas emitters to reduce emissions, disclose their climate-related
risks, and adopt environmentally responsible governance.40 CDP is a
not-for-profit organization that represents more than 800 institutional
investors who manage more than $100 trillion in capital to seek disclo-
sures of environmental impacts, such as greenhouse gas emissions,
from thousands of companies.
Institutional investors with longer-term horizons tend to give
greater weight in their portfolios to firms with higher environmental
and sustainability scores than investors with shorter-term outlooks.41
This suggests that concern over long-term environmental risks is more
significant than philanthropic motives in driving institutional inves-
37. Grewal et al., supra note 5, at 2–3; Chen et al., supra note 33, at 2.
38. Paul C. Stern et al., Design Principles for Carbon Emissions Reduction Pro-
grams, 44 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 4847, 4847–48 (2010); Michael P. Vandenbergh et al.,
Implementing the Behavioral Wedge: Designing and Adopting Effective Carbon Emis-
sions Reduction Programs, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. 10547, 10547–54 (2010).
39. Ceres Investor Network, CERES, https://www.ceres.org/networks/ceres-inves-
tor-network (last visited Feb. 26, 2018) [https://perma.cc/7D9G-N63U]. See also Ceres
Investor Network, Year in Review 2016–2017, CERES (Apr. 21, 2017), https://www.
ceres.org/resources/reports/ceres-investor-network-year-review [https://perma.cc/
H8TD-TXJT].
40. Ed Crooks, Investors to Push Highest-Emitting Companies to Do More on Cli-
mate, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 12, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/beaf6560-df03-11e7-a8a4
-0a1e63a52f9c [https://perma.cc/SH75-KF3B].
41. Rajna Gibson Brandon & Philipp Kru¨ger, The Sustainability Footprint of Insti-
tutional Investors (Swiss Fin. Inst. Research Paper No. 17-05, 2018), https://ecgi.global/
sites/default/files/working_papers/documents/finalbrandonkruger1.pdf [https://
perma.cc/SPC3-TY8E].
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\6-1\TWL105.txt unknown Seq: 9  6-DEC-18 14:52
2018] PRIVATE CLIMATE GOVERNANCE 187
tors’ activism on environmental issues. This interpretation is rein-
forced by research that finds managing downside risk drives
investments and shareholder activism more than other forms of envi-
ronmental responsibility.42
The role of long-term horizons and the emphasis on downside risk
present challenges for corporate activism as a force to drive emissions
reductions, as opposed to adopting more resilient business practices to
prepare for climate-related risks. Even when downside risks dominate
investor thinking, concern about stranded assets can stimulate inves-
tor pressure to reduce use and dependency on fossil fuels. However,
most investors continue to focus on short-term risks and returns,
which reduces interest in climate-related activism.43 Thus, policy plas-
ticity in institutional shareholder activism significantly depends on in-
vestors taking a long-term outlook, which would explain the
prominent role of pension funds.
In another example of willingness to engage in active private-envi-
ronmental governance, investment rating firms and insurers are
threatening to deny coverage or lower credit ratings as a tool to com-
pel action, such as adaptation to climate change.44 Short-term out-
looks, combined with cognitive biases about risk, may lead investors
to under-estimate exposure to climate-related risks, which leads some
analysts to recommend that financial regulatory agencies and central
banks assume active roles in managing financial exposure to climate
risks.45 Nonetheless, the growth of climate-related investor activism in
recent years suggests that even if private governance by investors is
inadequate to completely address climate change, it can nonetheless
play an important role.
In addition to the examples discussed above of Walmart’s private-
governance initiatives on consumer products, the rapid move of many
major automobile manufacturers to develop electric cars, and even to
announce a schedule for phasing out internal combustion vehicles al-
42. Chitru S. Fernando et al., Corporate Environmental Policy and Shareholder
Value: Following the Smart Money, 52 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS, 2023–51
(2017); Andreas G. F. Hoepner et al., ESG Shareholder Engagement and Downside
Risk, AM. FIN. ASS’N (Jan. 2018), http://www.q-group.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/
02/SHAREHOLDER-ENGAGEMENT-2018-01-31.pdf [https://perma.cc/42VX-
VRFZ].
43. CASEY ASPIN, THE MISSING 55%: VOTING RECORDS FOR THE 10 LARGEST
UTILITY INVESTORS SHOW DIVERGENCE ON CLIMATE RISK, PREVENTABLE SUR-
PRISES 2 (2017), available at https://preventablesurprises.com/wp-content/uploads/
2017/11/Missing-55-V7-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/SM9N-4NFS]; Nicholas Silver, Blind-
ness to Risk: Why Institutional Investors Ignore the Risk of Stranded Assets, 7 J. SUS-
TAINABLE FIN. & INV. 99 (2017).
44. Mathiesen, supra note 7, at 454; Nesbit, supra note 8; Kollewe, supra note 9;
Ralph, supra note 10.
45. Emanuele Campiglio et al., Climate Change Challenges for Central Banks and
Financial Regulators, 8 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 462, 464 (2018).
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together, illustrates powerful interest by at least some firms in setting
emissions standards that far exceed public regulations.46
III. CARROTS AND STICKS IN PRIVATE GOVERNANCE
A. Divestment versus Engagement
The announcement in 1977 of the Sullivan Principles—a voluntary
code of conduct for businesses operating in apartheid South Africa—
is often cited as the moment when corporate social responsibility en-
tered the mainstream.47 However, others viewed the Sullivan Princi-
ples as a disingenuous attempt to provide a semblance of moral
legitimacy to firms doing business in South Africa.48 Fierce disputes
centered on questions of whether institutional investors should divest
their funds from all corporations doing business in South Africa, selec-
tively divest from firms that did not comply with the Sullivan Princi-
ples, or engage as investors to persuade companies to improve their
conduct and exert pressure on the South African government to abol-
ish apartheid.49 A number of contemporary analyses as well as post-
apartheid historical studies argued that the amount of funds being
divested were far too small to appreciably weaken the apartheid re-
gime.50 However, others argued that focusing on the dollar value of
46. Jack Ewing, Volvo, Betting on Electric, Moves to Phase Out Conventional En-
gines, N.Y. TIMES (July 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/05/business/energy-
environment/volvo-hybrid-electric-car.html [https://perma.cc/4BLY-33SX]; Peter Hol-
ley, Death of Gas and Diesel Begins as GM Announces Plans for All-Electric Future,
WASH. POST (Oct. 2, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/innovations/wp/20
17/10/02/death-of-diesel-begins-as-gm-announces-plans-for-all-electric-future/ [https://
perma.cc/EGY3-T8PR]; Bill Vlasic & Neal E. Boudette, G.M. and Ford Lay Out
Plans to Expand Electric Models, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 2, 2017), https://www.nytimes.
com/2017/10/02/business/general-motors-electric-cars.html [https://perma.cc/U69D-
VL84].
47. S. Prakash Sethi & Oliver F. Williams, Creating and Implementing Global
Codes of Conduct: An Assessment of the Sullivan Principles as a Role Model for De-
veloping International Codes of Conduct—Lessons Learned and Unlearned, 105 BUS.
& SOC’Y REV. 169, 172 (2000) (“[T]he Sullivan Principles were the turning point that
crystalized the then ongoing debate as to the changing societal expectations of corpo-
rate conduct . . . . [T]he locus of debate permanently shifted to how and to what
extent corporations should be held accountable for the societal impact of their busi-
ness activities and the benefits they generate and harms they cause to various ele-
ments of society.”).
48. Patricia Arnold & Theresa Hammond, The Role of Accounting in Ideological
Conflict: Lessons from the South African Divestment Movement, 19 ACCT., ORGS. &
SOC’Y 111, 115 (1994) (“[T]he Sullivan accounting system was not developed in re-
sponse to pluralist demands for corporate accountability. . . . To the contrary, the
accounting system was used by corporations to buttress the progressive force argu-
ment and defend business interests in South Africa against demands for
withdrawal.”).
49. William H. Kaempfer et al., Divestment, Investment Sanctions, and Disinvest-
ment: An Evaluation of Anti-Apartheid Policy Instruments, 41 INT’L ORG. 457 (1987).
50. Id. at 467–72; Arnold & Hammond, supra note 48; Rebecca Leber, Divestment
Won’t Hurt Big Oil, and That’s OK, NEW REPUBLIC (May 20, 2015), https://newrepub
lic.com/article/121848/does-divestment-work [https://perma.cc/T3UR-FQKN]; Wil-
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divestiture missed the political power of divestment as a symbolic act
that could shape international perceptions of apartheid South Africa
as a pariah state.51
Similar disputes are taking place today as institutional investors face
growing pressure to divest from fossil-fuel companies and large green-
house gas emitters. Some invoke the Sullivan Principles as an example
of constructive engagement for change and as a benchmark against
which to evaluate investor and corporate codes of conduct with regard
to climate change.52 Others argue that, similarly to divestment from
South Africa, divestment from fossil-fuel companies is a powerful po-
litical tool whose symbolic impact may be far more important than its
financial impact.53
Analyses of divestment versus engagement often invoke Hirsch-
man’s Exit, Voice, and Loyalty and identify divestment as a form of
exit and engagement as a form of voice.54 Exit can serve different
goals: It can serve to disassociate investors from firms they find mor-
ally repugnant or embarrassing to be publicly associated with. This
was an important motive in early socially-responsible investment
(“SRI”) movements and remains so among many religiously affiliated
institutional investors.55 Others advocate exit instrumentally, with the
goal of changing corporate behavior.56 Voice serves the goal of chang-
ing behavior and can proceed in both formal and informal modes.57
liam MacAskill, Does Divestment Work?, NEW YORKER (Oct. 20, 2015), https://www.
newyorker.com/business/currency/does-divestment-work [https://perma.cc/SX3Z-
RL56].
51. Id.
52. Richard J. Millar et al., Principles to Guide Investment Towards a Stable Cli-
mate, 8 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 1, 2 (2018).
53. Leber, supra note 50; MacAskill, supra note 50, at 2; see Atif Ansar et al.,
Stranded Assets and the Fossil Fuel Divestment Campaign: What Does Divestment
Mean for the Valuation of Fossil Fuel Assets?, STRANDED ASSETS PROGRAMME 1, 14
(Oct. 2013), http://www.smithschool.ox.ac.uk/publications/reports/SAP-divestment-re
port-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/D2YR-MUB9].
54. Alex Gorman, Note, Exit vs. Voice: A Comparison of Divestment and Share-
holder Engagement, 72 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 113, 186 (2017); Michael R. Bash-
shur & Burak Oc, When Voice Matters: A Multilevel Review of the Impact of Voice in
Organizations, 41 J. MGMT., 1530–31 (2015); Terry McNulty & Donald Nordberg,
Ownership, Activism and Engagement: Institutional Investors as Active Owners, 24
CORP. GOVERNANCE 346, 347, 349 (2016); Cundill et al., supra note 5, at 606–07,
613–14; Goodman et al., supra note 14, at 193–96.
55. Proffitt & Spicer, supra note 4, at 166–67; Gorman supra note 54, at 126–27.
56. Ayling & Gunningham, supra note 12, at 141; see Gorman, supra note 54, at
118–20; Cundill et al., supra note 5, at 612, 619; Kaempfer et al., supra note 49, at 459.
57. Andrea Marandino, Shareholder Activism on Climate Change: Strengths and
Limitations of Resolutions, Engagement, and Fossil Fuel Divestment 13, 21–22 (Dec.
16, 2013) (unpublished M.Sc. thesis, University of London), http://www.lccge.bbk.ac
.uk/publications-and-resources/docs/Andrea-Marandino.pdf [http://perma.cc/539H-
Q84U] (distinguishing shareholder resolutions, which are debated publicly, from in-
formal engagement through private dialogue behind closed doors).
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Exit is often criticized as a crude tool—“all stick, no carrot”58—with
little nuance and prone to backfiring. If demand for shares is inelastic,
and if activists constitute a small fraction of investors, then divestment
will not affect a firm’s market value. Therefore, the effect of an exit
would largely be to remove dissidents from the conversation without
providing any offsetting financial pressure. This would ultimately re-
duce, rather than increase, the incentives for the firm to change.59 Ec-
onomic investigations of the impacts of divestment on firms doing
business in apartheid South Africa in the 1980s and 90s, and on fossil-
fuel companies in recent years, find no important impact of divest-
ment campaigns on share prices.60 Other analyses produce results that
are more optimistic about the impacts of divestment, but even they do
not predict significant impacts on share prices until a significant frac-
tion (around 10% or more) of the international investment market
divests from the targeted shares.61
Proponents of divestment argue that the most important and influ-
ential consequences of divestment are not its direct impacts on share
prices, but the message it sends.62 Divestments by large investors tend
58. Gorman, supra note 54, at 151.
59. Id. at 155. See also HIRSCHMAN, supra note 14, at 24, 45 (noting that exit by
consumers can backfire) (“[I]f demand is highly inelastic with respect to quantity
change, revenue losses will be quite small and the firm will not get the message that
something is amiss. . . . [M]anagement . . . may be less sensitive to the loss of revenue
due to the switch of customers to a [competitor] than to . . . protests by customers who
‘raise hell.’”).
60. Robert J. Shapiro & Nam D. Pham, The Financial Returns from Oil and Natu-
ral Gas Company Stocks Held by American College and University Endowments,
SONECON 4 (Dec. 2012), available at http://www.api.org/~/media/files/news/2012/12-
december/api-report-industry-returns-for-college-university-endowments.pdf [https://
perma.cc/CC94-JZ5F] (reporting that during a decade in which college and university
endowments reduced their holdings of oil and natural gas stocks, those stocks out-
performed other asset classes held by the endowments); Siew Hong Teoh et al., The
Effect of Socially Activist Investment Policies on the Financial Markets: Evidence from
the South African Boycott, 72 J. BUS. 35, 35 (1999) (finding that divestment and boy-
cotts of firms doing business in apartheid South Africa had “little visible effect on the
financial markets”); Kaempfer et al., supra note 49, at 462 (finding no impact of di-
vestment on share prices of firms doing business in apartheid South Africa).
61. Gorman, supra note 54, at 156–57.
62. Ayling & Gunningham, supra note 12, at 134–35 (“[T]he limited direct impact
of the divestment movement on public companies is not a deterrent to campaigners,
because the indirect effect of divestment could be significant. . . . Initially, the [divest-
ment] movement seeks to raise awareness of climate change and the role of the fossil
fuel extracting companies in it.”); Leber, supra note 50 (“If divestment campaigners’
only aim were to move markets, [critics would] have a point . . . . Divestment is not a
strategy itself, but a useful tactic for driving home the message of the broader cam-
paign: . . . the message is how the world needs to transition away from fossil fuels.”)
(noting that with campaigns to divest from firms doing business in South Africa and
from tobacco companies, “[f]inancial hardship was never the goal; the goal was politi-
cal action.”).
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\6-1\TWL105.txt unknown Seq: 13  6-DEC-18 14:52
2018] PRIVATE CLIMATE GOVERNANCE 191
to get significant media coverage,63 which can damage companies’
reputations.64
However, it is also important to recognize that comparisons be-
tween anti-apartheid divestment campaigns and climate divestment
campaigns often elide a crucial difference: Opponents of apartheid
only wanted companies to relocate their operations outside of South
Africa, whereas climate activists want fossil-fuel companies to funda-
mentally change their core business.65 Thus, opposition by fossil-fuel
companies is far greater than the opposition by companies doing busi-
ness with South Africa was.
Voice-centered engagement offers greater opportunity for nuance
and give-and-take than divestment. Active trading in shares may pro-
duce a background rate of apolitical financially motivated exit that is
large enough to obscure politically motivated acts of exit (divest-
ment). Not only among investors but more broadly throughout soci-
ety, voice has been an under-utilized response to dissatisfaction. Thus,
voice is more likely to be noticed when it is used.66 Shareholder reso-
lutions were rarely used before the 1980s, but the use of resolutions
grew rapidly with the rise of institutional investors.67 The last few de-
cades have seen especially rapid growth in the use of shareholder res-
olutions on ESG issues, which represent 40% of all shareholder
proposals.68 While most ESG proposals fail to win majority support,
they are gaining support rapidly, with notable gains in climate-related
resolutions (support for ESG proposals rose from 8% in 1999 to 21%
in 2013; support for environmental proposals rose from 18% in 2015
to 29% in 2017; proposals related to climate change received an aver-
age of 33% with three passing).69 Remarkably, even when ESG pro-
63. See John Schwartz, Rockefellers, Heirs to an Oil Fortune, Will Divest Charity of
Fossil Fuels, N.Y. TIMES (Sep. 21, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/22/us/heirs-
to-an-oil-fortune-join-the-divestment-drive.html [https://perma.cc/Z5EA-X4TW].
64. Ayling & Gunningham, supra note 12, at 145 (“Removal of fossil fuel compa-
nies’ social license to operate, through a process of reputational damage and stigmati-
zation, is a fundamental aim of the divestment movement.”).
65. Chelsie Hunt et al., A Comparative Analysis of the Anti-Apartheid and Fossil
Fuel Divestment Campaigns, 7 J. SUSTAINABLE FIN. INVEST. 64, 64–81 (2016).
66. HIRSCHMAN, supra note 14, at 31–33, 70–71 (“[F]or voice to function properly
it is necessary that individuals possess reserves of political influence which they can
bring into play when they are sufficiently aroused. That this is generally so—that, in
other words, there is considerable slack in political systems—is well recognized.”).
67. Gillan & Starks, supra note 4, at 55–73.
68. 2017 Proxy Season Review, SULLIVAN & CROMWELL 21 (2017), https://www.
sullcrom.com/siteFiles/Publications/SC_Publication_2017_Proxy_Season_Review.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7P4E-E8MH]; Grewal et al., supra note 5, at 7 (reporting that 40%
of shareholder initiatives in 2017 were ESG-related).
69. Grewal et al., supra note 5, at 5 (reporting the increase in support of ESG
proposals); 2017 Proxy Season Review, supra note 68, at 21 (reporting support for
environmental proposals); Proxy Season 2017: Analysing the Trends, PRINCIPLES FOR
RESPONSIBLE INV. (July 24, 2017), http://www.unpri.org/news-and-press/proxy-season-
2017-analysing-the-trends/355.article [https://perma.cc/SGH2-U7NT] (reporting that
climate-related proposals received an average of 33% support and listing three that
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posals fall far short of majority support, they can still have impact,
with management frequently adopting some or even all of the pro-
posed actions if a significant minority of shareholders appear to care
about the issue.70
The rapid growth of support for climate-related resolutions, and the
fact that management often adopts actions from failed proposals, at-
tests that management often views such proposals favorably and
shares the concerns of the shareholders who submit these proposals.
However, there appear to be opportunities for similar engagement
that are not being pursued. Most climate-related proposals fall into
two categories: calls for the company to disclose climate-related risks
(including the risks associated with a rapid global transition to clean
energy sources) or calls to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions.71 Dis-
closure of emissions and risks is likely a sensitive subject with manage-
ment because they emphasize negative aspects of the firm and may
damage the firm’s reputation when they are made public. The market
value of large companies has gone from being 83% tangible assets and
17% intangible in 1975, to 16% tangible and 84% intangible in 2015,
with an estimated quarter or more of that residing in goodwill, reputa-
tion, and brand value.72
Damage to a firm’s reputation can have serious consequences to its
value, and the greater the ratio of intangible to tangible value, the
greater this vulnerability may be. Uber’s value is almost entirely intan-
gible (its intellectual property and its network of drivers and custom-
ers), and when it faced a wave of bad publicity in 2017 over
revelations about its mistreatment of women employees and its CEO’s
treatment of Uber drivers, Uber’s favorability dropped sharply and its
market share dropped from 90% to 75%.73 Similarly, the market
value of United Airlines temporarily dropped by $1 billion following
news coverage of a passenger being badly beaten and forcibly re-
moved from a plane.74 Environmental performance also affects the
value of intangible assets: Small changes in the legal release of toxic
passed); see also Robert Monks et al., Shareholder Activism on Environmental Issues:
A Study of Proposals at Large US Corporations (2000–2003), 28 NAT. RES. FORUM
317, 321 (2004) (noting that even in 2000–2003, among ESG proposals, those related
to climate change and renewable energy received the strongest support).
70. See Grewal et al., supra note 5, at 12–13.
71. Proxy Season 2017: Analysing the Trends, supra note 69; Monks et al., supra
note 69, at 318, 325–26 (reporting that most climate-related shareholder resolutions
call for disclosing business risks associated with climate change).
72. Cate M. Elsten & Nick Hill, Intangible Asset Market Value Study?, 52 J. LI-
CENSING EXECUTIVES SOC’Y 245, 245 (2017).
73. Marco della Cava, Uber Has Lost Market Share to Lyft During Crisis, USA
TODAY (Jun. 13, 2017, 10:23 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/news/2017/06/
13/uber-market-share-customer-image-hit-string-scandals/102795024/ [https://perma.
cc/K8TW-D7EN].
74. Adam Shell, United Airlines Stock Loses Altitude, Sheds $255 Million in Value,
USA TODAY (Apr. 11, 2017, 1:05 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/mar
kets/2017/04/11/united-stock-falls/100325694/ [https://perma.cc/PV2X-MTWZ].
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substances can affect the value of a company’s intangible assets by
tens of millions of dollars.75 Thus, it would not be surprising if man-
agement worried that disclosing emissions or risks from climate
change might reveal damaging information about the company that
would hurt its reputation and require it to undertake costly measures
to reduce emissions or mitigate climate-related risks.
The affect heuristic in risk perception is driven by an unconscious
desire for consistency: If one aspect of a thing is good, then people will
tend to believe that every aspect is good, and they will downplay or
even ignore harmful aspects.76 Similarly, if one aspect is bad, they will
downplay or ignore any good qualities. This heuristic may amplify the
negative reaction to shareholder initiatives: If there are benefits as
well as costs to adopting a shareholder initiative, but the manager
thinks primarily of the negative aspects, she may under-estimate the
benefits or neglect them altogether. Negative views of the conse-
quences of disclosure may also activate solution aversion, a psycholog-
ical phenomenon in which a person faced with a problem for which
the only viable solution is repugnant will tend to deny that the prob-
lem exists.77 Solution aversion is believed to be a significant contribu-
tor to the rejection of climate science by members of the public who
dislike big government and believe that the only solutions to climate
change will involve massive expansion of government regulations.78
Where voice meets resistance, the implied or explicit threat of exit
can be important. Indeed, Hirschman writes of exit and voice as two
complementary tools that work best when balanced.79 However, if exit
and voice are both wielded with an emphasis on the negative—risks,
costs, and shameful disclosures—they are unlikely to have as powerful
an effect as they could if they complemented a lighter, more optimistic
note.
B. Fiduciary Responsibilities
Exit is relatively straightforward for individual investors, but fund
managers have fiduciary responsibilities to investors.80 Sjo¨stro¨m ar-
gues that the duty to act in the best interest of the investors encom-
passes not just financial interests but also environmental, social, and
ethical concerns.81 For funds with an explicit focus on social or envi-
75. Shameek Konar & Mark A. Cohen, Does the Market Value Environmental
Performance?, 83 REV. ECON. & STAT. 281 (2001).
76. Paul Slovic et al., Risk as Analysis and Risks as Feelings: Some Thoughts about
Affect, Reason, Risk, and Rationality 24 SOC’Y RISK ANALYSIS 311, 314–15 (2004).
77. Troy H. Campbell & Aaron C. Kay, Solution Aversion: On the Relation Be-
tween Ideology and Motivated Disbelief, 107 J. PERSONALITY SOC. PSYCHOL. 809, 809
(2014).
78. VANDENBERGH & GILLIGAN, supra note 15, at 3–4, 9.
79. HIRSCHMAN, supra note 14, at 120–26.
80. See Sjo¨stro¨m, supra note 4, at 151.
81. Id. at 142.
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ronmental responsibility, investors may be assumed to share the val-
ues of the fund; but for pension funds, the manager or trustees cannot
assume that the beneficiaries share their values on social or environ-
mental issues.82
However, there is a growing sense that when climate change and
other environmental risks threaten the long-term performance of an
investment, then not only do fund managers have the discretion to
consider climate-related risks, but they may even be obliged to do so.
A 2002 report, Value at Risk, by the Ceres organization, asserted that:
Neglecting to assess [climate] risks is neither prudent nor responsi-
ble. The more information on climate-related damage accumulates,
the more the refusal to examine these risks carries the potential for
breach of fiduciary duty. . . . To fulfill their fiduciary duties, inves-
tors and directors now must understand which industry sectors and
companies are exposed to the greatest risks, what measures if any
are being taken to reduce them, and how effective they are likely to
be.83
In practice, pension funds appear to be interpreting their discretion
in the matter of climate risks to allow the fund manager to exercise
voice, but not exit.84 However, without exit as a realistic option, voice
may lose its power. Thus, pension funds and other funds managed on
behalf of beneficiaries—who may not be assumed to have intrinsic
concern over climate change—leave their managers in a position of
limited discretion and power to use the fund’s shares for climate
activism.
C. Exit, Voice, and Carrots
A great deal of opposition to reducing emissions of greenhouse
gases and other dangerous pollutants may derive from the affect heu-
ristic. It is common to assume that reducing emissions must be diffi-
cult and expensive. When thinking of the cost and difficulty, it is
difficult to remind oneself that there are beneficial aspects to using
less fossil fuel.85 This may explain why so many businesses fail to no-
82. Id. at 141.
83. INNOVEST STRATEGIC VALUE ADVISORS, INC., VALUE AT RISK: CLIMATE
CHANGE AND THE FUTURE OF GOVERNANCE 1 (2002).
84. RHODE ISLAND TREASURY ENGAGEMENT OVERVIEW 2017 SHAREHOLDER
SEASON, supra note 6 (reporting shareholder engagement on climate issues by the
Rhode Island pension fund); BINSTED ET AL., supra note 6, at 20 (“Divestment or
clean energy investment targets are not supported by [Maryland State Retirement
and Pension System] staff, while an evaluation of specific asset classes . . . is recom-
mended for the next regular allocation review.”).
85. See generally Greer K. Gosnell et al., A New Approach to an Age-Old Prob-
lem: Solving Externalities by Incenting Workers Directly 7, 19 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 22316, 2016), http://www.nber.org/papers/w2316 [https:/
/perma.cc/Q75E-C4M6].
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tice for many years that they have opportunities to simultaneously cut
pollution emissions and save a great deal of money.
Even though jet fuel is one of the largest expenses in the airline
industry, Virgin Atlantic Airlines went for many years without realiz-
ing that it was wasting thousands of tons of fuel every year because
their pilots did not have a good sense of how efficiently they were
flying.86 Then in 2014, Virgin partnered with a team of economists
who provided the pilots with feedback about their fuel usage and in-
centives to safely conserve fuel.87 Shortly after this program was
launched, the pilots began saving the equivalent of around 700 tons
per year of fuel, which reduced the airline’s CO2 emissions by nearly
2,000 tons per year, while saving around $600,000 annually.88 Moreo-
ver, pilots reported that participating in the fuel-efficiency exercise
improved their job satisfaction.89
In 1994, as the Copenhagen Protocol to phase out ozone-destroying
substances went into effect, the telecommunications company Nortel
needed to find a replacement for the chlorofluorocarbon chemical
that it had used for many years to clean electronic circuit boards.90 It
discovered that it could do the job just as well with water and a bi-
odegradable citrus-based product, and after spending $1 million to re-
tool its assembly line, it saved $4 million over the next three years.91
Vandenbergh and Gilligan list a number of other cases where oppor-
tunities to save money while reducing consumption of energy and
emissions of pollution went unnoticed until concern over the environ-
ment led a firm to examine its environmental footprint.92
Pessimism about “rebound effects,” in which inexpensive energy-
efficient technology would stimulate greater use of the technology and
thus undermine the intended reductions, led to a prediction that the
introduction of solid-state lighting (such as LEDs) would cause per-
capita electricity consumption to rise by roughly 60% between 2005
and 2030.93 Instead, per-capita electricity consumption plateaued
around 2010 and then began to drop.94
These examples of neglect or undue pessimism about the prospect
of reducing energy consumption and pollution, together with CDP’s
report that ninety-nine large companies reduced their supply chains’
86. See id. at 23.
87. Id. at 6–7.
88. Id. at 28.
89. Id. at 28.
90. RICHARD ELLIOT BENEDICK, OZONE DIPLOMACY: NEW DIRECTIONS IN SAFE-
GUARDING THE PLANET 226, 232 (1998).
91. BINSTED ET AL., supra note 6, at 232; Pamela Wexler, Saying Yes to “No
Clean”, in OZONE PROTECTION IN THE UNITED STATES: ELEMENTS OF SUCCESS 92–93
(Elizabeth Cook ed., World Resources Institute, 1996).
92. VANDENBERGH & GILLIGAN, supra note 15, at 4.
93. J. Y. Tsao et al., Solid-State Lighting: An Energy-Economics Perspective, 43 J.
PHYSICS D 1, 6–7 (2010).
94. Davis, supra note 28.
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CO2 emissions by more than 550 million metric tons per year,95 leads
me to believe that there is vast opportunity to reduce pollution and
greenhouse gas emissions through cost-saving energy efficiency.
Walmart’s experience selling energy-efficient light bulbs and the in-
vestments and commitments that automobile manufacturers are mak-
ing to transition from gasoline to electric vehicles also suggest that
there are attractive business opportunities for bringing convenient en-
ergy-efficiency and pollution-reducing technology into people’s homes
and garages.
Beyond energy efficiency, corporate interest in renewable energy is
growing rapidly. More than twenty-two Fortune 500 companies have
pledged over the coming years to purchase renewable power equal to
their entire energy consumption.96 Many companies, like Apple, see
this as an opportunity not only to protect the environment, but also to
save hundreds of millions of dollars compared to buying conventional
electricity.97
It may well be the case that management often starts from an as-
sumption that reducing emissions of greenhouse gases and other pol-
lutants must be expensive and bad for business, and because of that
assumption, management does not look for opportunities to save
money while also reducing emissions. Indeed, some evidence for this
is found in the discovery of a wide-spread “brownwashing” phenome-
non. Greenwashing occurs when a company exaggerates its accom-
plishments and misleads investors and consumers to believe that its
environmental impact is smaller than it really is. Brownwashing is the
mirror image and occurs when a company succeeds in reducing emis-
sions, adopting more sustainable practices, etc., but does not publicize
the achievement.98 Three possible explanations are advanced for
brownwashing: First, a company may perceive that investors believe
reducing greenhouse gas emissions hurts profits.99 There is some evi-
dence for this interpretation in the observation that Chinese compa-
nies winning environmental awards do not see any benefit to their
95. CDP, supra note 3, at 3, 6.
96. Brad Plumer, A Year After Trump’s Paris Pullout, U.S. Companies Are Driv-
ing a Renewables Boom, N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/
01/climate/companies-renewable-energy.html [http://perma.cc/X6W6-Y5HH]; D.
Manning et al., Private Procurement, Public Benefit: Integrating Corporate Renewable
Energy Purchases with Utility Resource Planning, CTR. FOR NEW ENERGY ECON. 2
(2016), available at http://info.aee.net/hubfs/PDF/CNEE_Corporate%20Procurement
.pdf [https://perma.cc/6N7H-SSAH].
97. Diane Cardwell, Apple Becomes a Green Energy Supplier, With Itself as Cus-
tomer, N.Y. TIMES, (Aug. 23, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/24/business/en
ergy-environment/as-energy-use-rises-corporations-turn-to-their-own-green-utility-
sources.html [https://perma.cc/Y6VW-PHE9].
98. Eun-Hee Kim & Thomas P. Lyon, Greenwash vs. Brownwash: Exaggeration
and Undue Modesty in Corporate Sustainability Disclosure, 26 ORG. SCI. 633, 705
(2014).
99. Id. at 750.
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share prices and may even see significant reductions.100 A second in-
terpretation considers consumers and observes that many consumers
believe that environmentally-friendly products are inferior in qual-
ity.101 A third possibility is reputational insurance: Large firms may be
reluctant to make prominent claims for their environmentally-benefi-
cial actions for fear of drawing accusations of greenwashing or hypoc-
risy but may hold their beneficial actions in reserve to rebut future
criticism.102
Private governance could seize this opportunity to provide a more
optimistic message than is sent by a narrow focus on the harmful
things large corporations do. In addition to demanding disclosures of
harmful activity, institutional investors could propose systemic audits
to uncover unnoticed opportunities for cost-saving energy-efficiency
gains, reduction of waste streams, and purchases of inexpensive, clean
power. One might hope that framing emissions reduction in terms of
potential gains to the bottom line could engage the optimistic branch
of the affect heuristic and suffuse the audit with a sense of hope that
opportunities for cost-saving could be found rather than dread that
embarrassing data will need to be disclosed.
It is unlikely that this positive, collaborative mode of engagement
will work in all cases. Not all emissions reductions will be profitable,
and when cutting emissions entails cutting profits as well, conflict—
both between shareholders and management and among shareholders
themselves—will be almost inevitable. But the record of success in
reducing emissions through discovered opportunities for efficiency,
both in households and businesses, suggests that a considerable reduc-
tion in emissions will be possible before those conflicts become
necessary.
Private governance is not only an activity for institutional investors.
Companies that sell goods and services to the public can do a lot to
make energy efficiency and conservation easy and attractive to indi-
viduals and households. The average United States household could
reduce its energy consumption by 38% without any major changes of
lifestyle by taking a number of simple, voluntary steps, most of which
would pay themselves back or even generate net savings.103 Many
people do not take these actions because barriers—such as lack of
knowledge, inconvenience, or access to financing—prevent them.
100. Thomas Lyon et al., How Do Investors Respond to Green Company Awards in
China?, 94 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 1, 2 (2013).
101. Kim & Lyon, supra note 98, at 755.
102. A possible example of this is McDonald’s, which only buys fish certified by the
Marine Stewardship Council as sustainably caught but does not publicize this fact. See
Michael P. Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, 99 CORNELL L. REV.
129, 150 (2013).
103. Thomas Dietz et al., Household Actions Can Provide a Behavioral Wedge to
Rapidly Reduce U.S. Carbon Emissions, 106 PNAS 18452, 18452 (2009), http://
www.pnas.org/content/pnas/106/44/18452.full.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z9A2-HLPR].
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Analysis of best practices in past programs to promote energy effi-
ciency and conservation finds that well-designed initiatives to make it
attractive and convenient to adopt energy-efficiency measures at
home would likely reduce the average household’s greenhouse gas
emissions by 20%.104
Home energy efficiency has been studied extensively, and it is clear
that simple—but appropriately designed—incentives can work to
stimulate efficiency improvements. Energy efficiency in businesses is
much more poorly understood, and there is room for new research on
whether framing shareholder resolutions in terms of opportunity and
incentive, rather than scolding, would make them more appealing to
management and more effective at accomplishing activist investors’
goals.
IV. CONCLUSION
Shareholder activism can function as a form of private environmen-
tal governance and it is rapidly growing in both support and activity,
especially for issues related to climate change. Individuals and house-
holds can be effectively motivated to reduce their energy consumption
and greenhouse gas emissions with simple interventions that make it
attractive and convenient to do so. It is unclear whether a similar ap-
proach of framing shareholder resolutions to improve corporate en-
ergy efficiency would be similarly appealing to management, but at a
time when federal regulations to reduce emissions seem very unlikely,
investigating this line of action seems worthwhile.
104. Id.
